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Nonprofit Corporations -
A Survey of Recent Cases
Lizabeth A. Moody*
T HE RELATIVELY FEW PERSONS who write or teach in the field of non-
profit organizations are chronic complainers about the lack of
case law in the area.' The sparseness of authority leaves practitioners
without adequate guidelines with which to advise clients, and leaves
academicians without visible trends on which to develop theories.
A survey of the cases involving non-profit corporations reported
during recent months confirms this complaint and belies the predic-
tion made by Robert Lesher in 19672 that the non-profit corporation
was about to come of age. One would have thought that the hearings
of the Patman Committee, and then the Mills Committee, which
called nationwide attention to the vast resources controlled by foun-
dations, would have produced judicial and other activity in the area.
The Mills hearings3 did result in the adoption of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.4 This produced a period of intensive interest on the part
of the bar on a "how-to-do-it" level, as lawyers sought to save clients
from that worst of all fates-tax classification as a "private founda-
tion", 5 but little interest in the larger problem of the societal effect
of the operation of non-profit entities.
When tax law is eliminated from consideration (as it is in the
cases here surveyed) and one looks to the nuts and bolts of non-profit
corporation law, the pickings are paltry. Recent cases, with only a
few exceptions, mainly concern themselves with peculiarities of local
law or merely catch up with long-established trends in other jurisdic-
tions. We omit, as merely repetitious, the many cases in many states,
granting or denying local property tax exemptions to various specific
items of land or structures-the exemption almost always being
granted only to property actually used for charitable purposes.6
*Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
1See, Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses and Abuses: 19 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 207 (1970)
Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, Bus.
LAWYER 951 (1967); Note, Corporations-Illegal Activities by Non-Profit Corpora-
tions, 8 ARiK. L. R. 110 (1954).
2 Lesher, supra note 1, at 451.
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives on
the Subject of Tax Reform, 91st Congress 1st Session (1969). Hearings before the
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, on H.R. 13270, 91st Congress 1st Session
(1969).
4 Pub. L. 91-172, (Dec. 30, 1969) 83 Stat. 532.
5 See, Note, Private Foundationss Tax Reform Act of 1969, 26 THE CoipocATIoN J. 245
(Sept.-Nov. 1971).
For typical cases see In re Estate of Allen, 17 Cal. App. 3d 401, 94 Cal. Rptr. 648
(no tax exemption for a fraternal order) ; Milton Hospital & Cony. Home v. Board
of Assessors, 271 N.E. 2d 745 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971) (leased portions of charitable
corporation building) ; Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n., 26 Utah 2d 227, 487
P. 2d 1272 (1971) (apartment house owned by non-profit corporation).
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Definitional problems are a common ague. Generally they arise
in the context of a statute providing for the incorporation of non-
profit entities, or in statutes (or case law doctrines) providing special
rules applicable to non-profit corporations. 7
For example, in Peters v. Poor Sisters of Saint Frances Seraph,8
the fundamental question for decision was whether or not a charitable
not-for-profit hospital was included within the provisions of the In-
diana Anti-Injunction Statute. The hospital sought to enjoin a strike
by its employees. The court's power to grant relief depended upon
the application of the Act, which had no express exemption for char-
itable hospitals. The same question had been raised in other jurisdic-
tions with similar legislation and the Indiana Court (sitting en banc)
confronted split authority.9 It concluded that there was no such ex-
emption in Indiana, on two grounds:
(a) The purpose of the legislation was to minimize strife
in labor relations, and to exempt hospitals would not serve
that end; and
(b) The familiar doctrine that exemptions to statutes should
be strictly construed.
Exemption from workmen's compensation acts presents similar
issues. In Georgia Osteopathic Hospital Inc. v. Strickland,10 the court was
concerned with the interpretation of the state Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act's definition of "employer" as, ". . . any individual, firm,
association or corporation engaged in any business operated for gain
or profit... ."I1 The State Board of Workmen's Compensation ruled,
in making an award to the employee of a hospital, that it was "oper-
ated for gain" in that it showed net worth increases each year, its
income exceeding its operating expenses. Previously the Supreme
Court of Georgia had ruled, with respect to the same hospital, that
it was not a "charitable" institution within the meaning of state
statutes exempting charities from ad valorent taxes.'2 The Board
thought the decision decisive, but the Supreme Court of Georgia dis-
agreed, reversing its decision. In so doing it emphasized that "char-
itable" and "non-profit" are not synonymous terms. The test of "non-
profit" is not a function of accounting ("whether it has an excess
See generally, DiMarco and Kane, Privileges and Immunities of Non-Profit Organi-
zations, 19 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 264 (1970).
8 267 N.E. 2d 558 (Ind. App. 1971).
9 Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania Courts had held similar statutes to exclude
charitable hospitals. See, St. Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Comm., 320 Mass.
467, 70 N.E. 2d 10 (1946) ; Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300
N. Y. S. 1111 (1937) ; Western Pennsylvania Hosp. v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 17 A.
2d 206 (1941); Petition of Salvation Army, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A. 2d 479 (1944). The
court in the principal case (at 567) stated, by way of summation, that in these
jurisdictions the purpose of the statutes was to prevent imposition on labor and to
assist it in, "bargaining with employers over the products and profits of their labors,"
and that, "the charitable hospital has no such profits to bargain with." But, ef.
Billington, Hospitals, Unions, and Strikes, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 70 (1969).
10 123 Ga. App. 86, 179 S.E. 2d 560 (1970).
11 GA. CODE AN., § 114-101 (1956).
12 Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E. 2d 402 (1962).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss3/3
.21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (3)
of income over expenses for several years"), but one of distribution
of gains ("no part of the income or profit of which is distributable
to its members; officers and directors"). 13 The court further ruled
that, "the fact that member-doctors clearly benefit in their private
practice from the hospital's operation does not make this a business
run for gain".' A strong dissenting opinion argues that a "non-profit"
corporation under the contemplation of the Act was a "purely char-
itable institution." As the dissent pointed out, the Board had found the
institution to be operated merely for the purpose of providing facili-
ties for members of the staff and for training doctors of osteopathic
medicine. 15
In holding that "non-profit" does not necessarily mean "char-
itable" the majority opinion is clearly consistent with holdings in
similar cases.16 A more complex question is the one raised by the
dissent: How much may members benefit from the corporation before
the courts will pierce the veil of non-profitability and classify the
entity as a corporation for gain?
Professor Oleck, in an article 17 dealing with recently enacted
New York legislation asserts that the use of a non-profit corporation
for individual gain is an "abuse of non-profit status."
a non-profit organization is, by definition, one that
nobody owns, in that nobody is supposed to get from it any
personal profit (in the pecuniary sense) such as owners get
from theim property .... 18
He concludes that:
Probably half of all n6-profit organizations are run by
individuals or small groups (very often almost conspiratorial
in nature) who are interested and active solely or almost
solely in their own profit or advantage therefrom, while they
loudly proclaim their altruism.19
and warns that legislation similar to that of New York encourages
such activities. The dissenting opinion in the Strickland case sounds
the same warning note.
On the other hand, Santos v. Chappel,20 one of the first cases to
deal with the New York Act, indicates that the courts may be tacitly
responsive to the problems raised by Professor Oleck. Even under
18 123 Ga. App. 86 at 87, 179 S.E. 2d 560 at 562 (1970).
14 Id.
15 Co'mpare the. approach taken by the dissent in Strickla'nd with the prohibitions on
private foundations imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, in particular 26 USCA
§503; Pub.L. 91-172, Title 11§ '101(j) (7)-1(14), 121 (b) (B), 83 Stat. 527, 542.16 See 1' FLETCMHltR CYCLOIPEDIA COPPtORAAIONS (1963)' § 112, Model Non-Profit Corporation
Act (1964).
17 Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and the: New Non-Profit Corporation Laws, 20 CLv.
ST. L. REV. 145 (1971).
19 Id..at .146.' Misuse: of charitable status is, of course, VItra vires too: See, Good .Will
Home Assn. *v. Er,*in,' 266'*A. 2d'218 (Me. 1970) (a "boys' home" that ran a school
that charged $2800 tuition fee). See discussion in text below, at.note 57.
19 Supra note 17 at 165.
20 1-8U-N. Y. S, 2d-570. (Sup. Ct..1971).
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the liberal provisions, of the Act, there are some :limits to the profit-
making activities of a not-for-profit: organization.
The Santos case involved the Long!Island -Board bf Realtors, Inc.,
a trade association organized, accordihg: t6 its c6rtificate of' incorpora-
tion, to unite and upgrade realtbrs and improve their community
image. As one of its. activities the* c6rporation operated a multiple
listing service which. had netted -the corporation $300,000 and its
members $6,000,000 in 1969 alone. -.
Under the New York Act there' are four'types. (designated Types
A, B, C and D) of ndt-for-profit corporations The'statute contem-
plates the formation of not-for-profit corporations not only of the tra-
ditional type formed for. a puipose not for financial gain or pecuniary
profit but also of a kind formed' for a lawful."biisiness purpose and
in fact what is referred to as an.:"adapter".corporation which may
be formed for any purposes. whatsoever when authorized by any
other corporate law of the state.21
The court found that the corporation inquestion could not qualify
as any of the specified types of a not-for-profit-corporation and operate
the multiple listing service: Types A and B-required that tht activity
be for nonbusiness purposes. (Since the essential nature of the service
was business,, it could not qualify.) Type C: allowed business purposes
but only to achieve a public or quasi-public objective. (The indivi-
dual participants were making money in this case.) Type D was ruled
totally unsuitable, (There was no legislation -authorizing such a cor-
poration.) . .
25 N. Y. NoT-FOR-PRoFrr CoRP. LAW § 201 .(McKinney 1970) provides:
(a) *1 .
(b) A corporation, of a type and for-a purpose or purposes as follows, may
be formed under this chapter, provided consents required under any other
statute of this state have been obtained:
Type A-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for
any lawful non-business purpose'-'or purposes' including, but not limited
to, any one or more of the following non-pecuniary purposes; civic, patriotic,
political, social, fraternal,' athletic, agricultural, horticultural, animal
husbandry, and for a professional commercial, industrial, trade or service
association.
Type B-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any
one or more of the following non-business purposes: Charitable, educational,
religious, scientific, literary, cultural or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.
Type C-A not-for-profit'corporatio, of this type may be formed for
any lawful business purpose to achieve 'a la'wful -public or quasi-public
objective.. . ' .
Type D--A not-for-profit corporation of this fypemay be formed under
this chapter when such formation is' authized by any other corporate law
of this state for any business or non-business, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary,
purpose or purposes specified by such, other law, whether such purpose or
purposes are also within types 'A, B, C ab6vc or otherwise.
(c) If a corporation is formed for purposes "which' are within both type
A and type B above, it shall-'.be.-onsidered -a ty06 B corporation. If a
corporation has among its- purposes any -purpose which is within type C,
such corporation, shall .be. considered, -a' type C corporation. A type D"
corporation .shall be considered,- a-type. B. corporation- unless provided to
the contrary in .-the other- corporate ,law, authorizing formation under this
chapter of the type D corporation,
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss3/3
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In Santos, the operation of the multiple listing service was clearly
so tainted with profit making for members that it gives little guidance
to just how much of an umbrella the New York statute may provide
to such activities. On the other hand, People ex rel Groman v. Sinai
Temple22 (dealing with the seemingly much simpler provisions of
California law) clearly approved precisely the type of behavior
which Professor Oleck would characterize as non-profit for profit.
The defendant Sinai Temple was organized for religious and
cemetery purposes. It acquired a cemetery and mortuary operation
which it operated at a considerable profit in competition with others
who operated for gain. The profits were used to give a discount on
cemetery plots to members of the congregation and to subsidize the
religious activities which reduced the members' dues.
The court held that the statute did not expressly prohibit the
earning or accumulating of profits by corporations but the "distribu-
ion of gains, profits, or dividends to the members." The key, of course,
is the conclusion that furnishing benefits to members without charge
is not per se the payment of a dividend, gain or profit by the corpora-
tion (the same result reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Strickland.)
In Borden v. Baldwin,23 the court carefully distinguished the dif-
ference between distributions to members while the corporation is
still operating, and distributions on dissolution. The case presented
a situation in which a non-profit corporation organized for fox hunting
sold its property and moved its operations to another county. The
members had agreed at the time of the sale that all debts would be
paid from the proceeds and the remainder put in trust. The income
would be used to support the operations in the other county for
three years. At the end of the three year period, each member at
the date of sale would have the option to terminate his membership
and withdraw his pro rata share. When the time came for distribu-
tion, the new members did not want to allow the funds to be with-
drawn. The court held the distribution provision invalid, relying on
the Pennsylvania Non Profit Corporation Law prohibiting dividends
to members.2 4 The court said:
In granting the privilege of incorporation to qualified
non-profit groups, the Legislature has rightfully imposed
certain, duties and safeguards, one -of which is the require-
ment of formal dissolution before such corporation can dis-
burse its funds to its membership. That which should have
2 20 Cal. App. 3d 614t, 99 Cal. Reptr. 603 (1971).
23 444 Pa. 577, 291 A. 2d 892 (1971).
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 7304 (1933) provides: "No dividends shall be directly or
indirectly paid on any such shares nor shall the shareholders be entitled to any
portion of the earnings of such corporations derived through increment of value
upon its property or otherwise incidentally made, but upon dissolution of any such
corporation the shareholders shall he entitled to a pro rata distribution of the assets
thereof."
Sept. 1972
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been done to bring about the desired result of distribution
of pro rata shares was not, and for this reason the law will
not permit recovery by appellants.25
Spokane Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industry21
also involved the application of a Workmen's Compensation Act. An
employee of a retirement home for elderly people was injured when
a furnace exploded and filed a claim with the Washington Depart-
ment of Labor & Industries. Contrary to the Strickland case where
the evidence indicated the corporation in fact made profits, here the
court did not concern itself with distinctons between "charitable"
and "non-profit" corporations, ruling simply that the corporation was
organized in fact operated "in accordance with its charitable purposes
and not for profit or pecuniary gain. 27 Thus it did not come within
the statute which applied only to a corporation in fact, "operated for
profit or pecuniary gain."
Of greater interest was the claimant's contention that, since the
doctrine of charitable immunity had been abrogated in the state,
charitable institutions were properly, as a policy matter, within the
coverage of the Act. Although the court rejected this theory (saying,
"If charitable institutions are to be covered by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, it must be done by legislative enactment and not by
the courts."),28 the relationship between such exemptions and the doc-
trine of charitable immunity is clear. The abolition of charitable
immunity has come about in the same way it was created, for the
most part, by court-made legislation and not by statutory enactment.
If the theory is no longer needed to protect the charity from tort, it
is no longer needed to protect against other claims. Thus we may
anticipate that, sooner or later, abolition of the immunity doctrine
may have an effect on these "definitional problems."
The doctrine of charitable immunity itself is a strong contender
for one of the most litigated questions in the non-profit corporation
field. Over the past twenty years, one by one the states have rejected
the doctrine and have held charities liable for the torts of their ser-
vants.2 9 While the trend continues, those jurisdictions in which the
question is now settled are faced with secondary issues as claimants
seek to bring themselves within the scope of the abolition cases.
Typically the question is posed in a case filed subsequent to the
abolition ruling involving a cause of action accruing previously. Gen-
erally courts have abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity
only prospectively. The rationale of prospective application according
25 444 Pa. 577, 581, 281 A. 2d 992, 896 (1971).
26 4 Wash. App. 598, 483 P. 2d 168 (1971).
2f Id. at 599, 483 P. 2d at 169.
28 Id.
29 See, Horty, The Status of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in Hospital Cases, 25
OmO ST. L. J. 343, 353 (1964); Annot. 25 ALR 2d 29 (1952); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.17 (1956).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss3/3
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to most courts is the protection of -charities who have not obtained
insurance, reasonably relying on" prior decisions establishing immu-
nity.3 0
Three cases during the pas. years indicate the kind of hazard
which has accompanied the prospective nature of these rulings. Christy
v. Schwartr,3' was an action for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff allegedly due to the negligence of a hospital's agents and
employees, at the time of his birth in 1947. In 1961, Wisconsin, by
judicial decision, abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity
prospectively only.32 Within one year of becoming 21 years of age,
plaintiff commenced the suit. The issue before the court was when
plaintiff's cause of action "accrues". (It was acknowledged by both
parties that the proper rule of law was the one recognized when the
cause of action accrued.) The court held that the plaintiff's cause
of action "accrued" at the time of his injury in that a cause of action
during his infancy could have been pursued by a guardian or guard-
ian ad litem. The statute33 :allowing persons to bring an action upon
reaching majority Wat construed by the.court as only suspending the
running of the time Within Which a lawsuit must be commenced, not
changing the time of its "accrual" which the result in Christy clearly
accords with the reasoning'underlying the prospective abolition cases.
A more substantial, argument was presented-in Bodard v. Culver-
Stockton College.34 .The plaintiff, a college student, had been injured
by caustic marking material which he was using to mark lines on
an athletic field. The injury occurred. priorto November !0, 1969,
the date charitable immunity was abolished in Missouri.
Plaintiff made the initeresting and not illogical argument that
the abolition of 'charitable Immunity was -substantive rather than
procedural and thus could not be made, prospective, pointing out
that the college had not.relied on the doctrine of charitable immu-
nity but in fact had purchasd. liability insurance. Although the court
agreed that the change, was .substantive, it rejected the contention
that a substantive change, could not be prospective on the basis of
prior rulings in other jurisdictions, and held the fact of liability insur-
ance to be inmateriaL35 The court did.not comment on the rationale
for holding immune an entity which apparently had not felt itself
to be immune and had, taken the normal, steps to protect itself.
30 Abernathy v. Sisters of. St. Marys, 446 S.W. 2d.599 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) ; President
and Directors of Gebrgeosi College'v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
41 9 Wis. 2d 760, 183 N.W. 2d Si (1971).
s2 Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 107 N.W. 2d 292 (1961).
33 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 93.33 (1966).
34 471 S. W. 2d 253 (Mo. 1971).
35 A study of prior Missouri cases, however, would indicate that there was substantial
authority to support the procedural-substantive distinction with respect to prospective
application.- See, Note, Charitabl -'i'munity: 'A Fin'al Answerf, 35 Mo. L. Rev. 418
(1970) which discusses Abernathy v. 8isters of St..'Mary's, 446 S:. W. 2d 599 (Mo.
1969) (en bane) the case on which the court in Bodard relies.
Sept. 1972
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A third case involving a cause of action accruing prior to the
abrogation of charitable immunity is Clark v. Faith Hospital Associa-
tion.
3 6 A husband and wife sued for personal injuries sustained by
the wife as a result of a slip and fall while visiting the husband in
the hospital. The court reversed a decree of summary judgment in
favor of the hospital on the ground that a charitable corporation is
not conclusively presumed to be such on the sole basis of the objec-
tives of its articles of agreement. The court, although affirming the
rule that the abolition of charitable immunity was only prospective,
held that the plaintiffs might propound interrogatories to the defen-
dant to show it was not, in fact, a charitable institution. Thus the
approach is to attempt to avoid the prospective aspect by claiming
that charitable immunity was never applicable in the first place. The
same type of reasoning was used by the defendant charitable insti-
tution in Maniaci v. Marquette University.37 The defendant university
was sued by a student who had determined to leave the university.
Several university employees invoked a state statute providing for
temporary detention in the event of mental illness to detain plaintiff
until they could inform her father she was leaving. When the plain-
tiff sued for false imprisonment, the university claimed charitable
immunity although the state supreme court had abolished the exemp-
tion for negligent torts of employees of charitable institutions. It
asserted that charitable immunity was still in effect for intentional
torts. Charitable institutions, said the court, had never been immune
from responsibility for intentional torts.
Some jurisdictions, of course, are still debating the essential vi-
tality of the charitable immunity doctrine itself. In Howe v. Camp
Amon Carter38 an intermediate appellate court refused to hold that
the doctrine had been abolished in Texas, merely because in an earli-
er Supreme Court case applying the law of charitable immunity,
some members of the court had indicated the doctrine might be
reconsidered and changed in the future.3 9
The Howe case was a suit brought against a camp and its parent
association to recover for the loss of sight of a camper struck in the
eye by a sinker on a fishing line cast by a fellow camper. The defense
was charitable immunity. The more interesting question in the case
(even though not the more practical one from the point of view of
future litigants against charities) is the argument that charitable
immunity violates the due process clauses of the Texas and United
39 472 S. W. 2d 375 (Mo. 1971).
ST 50 Wis.2d 287, 184 N.W.2d 168 (1971).
38 462 S. W. 2d 624- (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
39 Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S. W. 2d 530 (Tex. 1966). In Villarreal
v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 443 S. W. 2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) another
Texas intermediate court reached the opposite result and refused to apply the doctrine
of charitable immunity to bar suit. See, "Where the Defense of Charitable Immunity
Has Been Abolished Prospectively It Will Also Be Applied Retroactively When The
Charity is Covered by Liability Insurance.' 7 Hous. L. REv. 394 (1970).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss3/3
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States Constitutions. The court afforded no consideration to the
argument on the basis that no authority was presented to support
the plaintiff's contention.40 Although clearly a novel theory, the
court's refusal to deal with its merits solely because of its novelty is
unsatisfactory especially in an era where stare decisis on constitutional
issues is less than conclusive.41
A somewhat more lengthy (if not more searching) discussion of
a constitutional issue appears in a recent New York case. The issue
is the relationship between non-profit corporations and those organ-
ized for profit. In S.P.S. Consultants, Inc. v. Lefkowitz42 a "for-profit"
abortion referral agency claimed inter alia that it was denied equal
protection by a state criminal statute prohibiting "for-profit referral
or recommendation of persons to a physician, hospital health related
facility or dispensary . . . for medical care or treatment." The policy
statement appended to the statute declared:
The security of the health and welfare of the residents
of this state requires that the utmost attention be given to
assure that persons seeking medical care and treatment in
this state receive adequate care rendered within the stand-
ards of ethics and public policy applicable to all practices of
medicine. 43
The plaintiffs contended that the distinction between profit and non-
profit was arbitrary in relation to the statement of policy and that
the state could show no compelling interest which would justify
the profit-non-profit dichotomy. A three-judge court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute finding it rationally related to a legiti-
mate state end.44 To justify its decision the court stated that the
practice of medicine requires a higher standard of conduct than that
traditional in the "competition of the market place," and cited the
evidence adduced at legislative hearings on the statute in question
with respect to practices of "for-profit" abortion referral agencies
(as compared to those of non-profit agencies). Interestingly the court
expressly says that had it found (as plaintiffs contended) that the
non-profit agencies' operations were identical to those of the for-profit
agencies it still would have found no invidious discrimination. This
conclusion, it said, was based on the "special" nature of the medical
profession permitting the state to outlaw commercial practices "to
free the profession to as great an extent as possible from all taints
of commercialism," (i.e., "profit" is a dirty word in New York).
40 A similar argument was made in Carrocclo v. Roger Williams Hospital, 104 R. I.
617, 247 A. 2d 903 (1968).
41 The United States Supreme Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the changing
nature of due process. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) ; Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
42 333 F. Supp. 1373 (S. D. N. Y. 1971).
43 Id. at 1375.
44 Cf. cases holding it unconstitutional to discriminate between public and private schools
for zoning restrictions cited in I. RATSKOpS', TIHE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NiGO 18-21 (3rd Ed. 1972); and I. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PKACICE 89 (2nd
Ed. 1956).
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Although the court's argument is somewhat sympathetic in the
abstract, the practice of medicine in this country, to date, has hardly
been regarded as "non-profit" and the decision raises questions as to
how much this court was influenced by the fact that the very sen-
sitive area of abortion was involved. How far such a doctrine could
be extended when other statutes granting privileges or prohibiting
activities on the basis of a non-profit, for-profit distinction are at-
tacked on the basis of equal protection is problematic. This is par-
ticularly true where the court is relying so heavily on United States
Supreme Court cases prior to the expansion of notions of equal pro-
tection and privilege and immunity over the past two decades.45
Another case in which the sensitive nature of the subject involved
may have resulted in a decision dictated by the court's reaction to
the issue rather than any objective appraisal of the merits is Gay
Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo. 46 The case resulted from the Secretary
of State of New York's refusing to file a certificate of incorporation
pursuant to the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, 47 on the
basis that the proposed corporation's name had unacceptable conno-
tations and that the purposes of the corporation promoted illegal
activities, The petitioners on the other hand contended that the in-
clusion of the word "gay" (a word in wide used to denote homosex-
uality) is neither illegal nor obscene48 and that the purpose of the
corporation was to work toward legal reform not to advocate break-
ing any law.49
45 The court relied on Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, (1955).
See, Carpenter, Our Constitutional Heritage: Economic Due Process and the State
Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 1027 (1959) which criticizes the result in Williamson. An Appen-
dix to the article collects state court cases invalidating regulation of business as
violations of due process under state constitutions.
40 66 Misc. 2d 4-56, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
47 N. Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 403 (MeKinney) 1970).
4s N. Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 301-308 contain no restrictions which would
exclude the corporation name proposed.
49 N. Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) provides: "A corporation of a type and
for a purpose or purposes may be formed under this chapter . . . for any lawful
non-business purposes ....
The purposes of the proposed corporation in Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 66
Misc.2d 456, 457, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994, 995-96 (Sup. Ct. 1971), were:
(a) To safeguard the rights guaranteed homosexual individuals by the
constitutions and civil rights laws of the United States and the several States,
through peaceful petition and assembly and nonviolent protest when
necessary.
(b) To speak out on public issues as a homosexual civil rights or-
ganization, working within the framework of the laws of the United
States and the several States, but vigilant and vigorous in fighting any
discrimination based on sexual orientation of the individual.
(c) To work for the repeal of all laws regulating sexual conduct and
practices between consenting adults.
(d) To work for the passage of laws ensuring equal treatment under the
law of all persons regardless of sexual orientation.
(e) To instill in homosexuals a sense of pride and selfworth.
(f) To promote a better understanding of homosexuality among homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals alike, in order to achieve mutual respect, under-
standing and friendship.
(g) To hold meetings and social events for the better realization of
the aforesaid purposes enunciated in (a) through (f) inclusive, above, and
(Continued on next page)
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The court affirmed the Secretary of State's action, reasoning:
Homosexual activity is illegal in New York. Members of a "homo-
sexual civil rights organization" by membership profess a "present
or future intent to disobey a penal statute of the state . . . ." The cor-
poration was therefore formed for an illegal purpose. The court said:
While the court has no personal experience upon which
to reply, it would seem that in order to be a homosexual the
prohibited act must have at some time been committed or at
least presently contemplated . . . If a lawful purpose is
sprinkled with unlawful activity a refusal to provide such
activity with corporate status cannot be an abuse of dis-
cretion. 50
Although giving lip service to the general rule that working for
the appeal of particular legislation is a lawful purpose, the court
assumes that in the present case one cannot do so without violating
or contemplating a violation of the law. This is clearly the minor
premise of the court's syllogism. The court's approach, if anything,
is to apply New Testament thinking 5' carried to an extreme, never
contemplated in our jurisprudence. To do so is clearly out of step
with modern legal thinking which encourages responsible law re-
form: e.g., trusts for such purposes are usually held to be charitable 52
and income tax exemptions are afforded under federal law. 53
A case of particular human interest is Paglia v. Staten island Little
LeagueH4 which included a grab bag of claimed violations of federal
rights in addition to questions involving New York's membership
corporation laws.
A member of a little league baseball team was threatened with
expulsion because his father, without excuse, failed to participate in
required parental "work sessions." The team was incorporated under
(Continued from preceding page)
to achieve, ultimately, the complete liberation of homosexuals from all in-
justices visited upon them as such, that they may receive ultimate recognition
as free and equal members of the human community.
50 66 Misc.2d 456, 4-59, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
51 Matthewo 5:27, 28. (The New Scofield Reference Bible).
Ye have heard that it was said by them of old, Thou shalt not commit
adultery; but I say unto you whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after
her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.
52 Annot., 22 A. L. R. 3d 886 (1968).
53 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 (c) (4)
As one court dealing with the question of charitable trusts has said:
We are led to conclude that a trust for a public charity is not invalid
merely because it contemplates the procuring of such changes in existing
laws as the donor deems beneficial to the people in general or to a class for
whose benefit the trust is created. To hold that an endeavor to procure by
proper means a change in a law is in effect an attempt to violate that law
would discourage improvement in legislation and tend to compel us to con-
tinue indefinitely to live under laws designed for an entirely different state
of society. Such view is opposed to every principle of our government
based on the theory that it is a government 'of the people, by the people
and for the people', and fails to recognize the right of those who make
the laws to change them at their pleasure when circumstances seem to
require. With the wisdom of the proposed change the courts are not
concerned. Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 116 A. 826, 827 (1922).
54 66 Misc. 2d 626, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
2n CLEmE ST. L. R. (a)
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the New York membership corporation 'law and was franchised by
the national organization, incorporated by an Act of Congress.
The national organization had'a policy that parents must accept
responsibility for the program. The local corporation had adopted
the rule:
A father must make the work party calls of the league.
Failure to attend or notify the league of reasons why he can-
not attend will lead to the suspension of the boy.
There was no misconduct on the part of the member of the organiza-
tion and the key question was its right to expel him for his father's
sins of omissions.55 The court did not find enough state involvement
to invoke the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution;5 6 nor a right of action under the Civil Rights
Acts57 due to the fact of federal incorporation of the national body,
holding that the issues were to be determined, under the provisions
of the New York laws governing the local corporation.5" It found
that under those laws the local corporation had the power to adopt
the questioned by-laws and regulations. 59 The board of directors being
vested by the by-laws with the power to suspend and expel members
could do so "for cause" when the conduct was destructive of the
organization. Since the little league could not survive -without the
voluntary work done by the parents of the members, the regulation,
was clearly justified according to the court. The board of directors
had not acted with respect to the member so that there was no final
determination for the court to review. 60 The court did state that it
55 The case clearly grew out of a telephone conversation which "got out of hand." The
court recites the facts as follows: -"Dr. Paglia testified in substance that in his
telephone conversation with William Caines, League President, on May 5 following
receipt of the card, [notifying him] his son Arnold would be suspended unless the
father made arrangements for a work session and in the early part of his conversation
the Doctor consented to a Sunday, May 9, work session. Later the entire tone changed
and resulted in Dr. Paglia bringing the instant proceeding in lieu of either participating
in said work session or appearing before the Staten Island Little League's Board of
Directors." Id. at 629, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 40. This raises the question "How far should
the state consent to settle through its courts the internal affairs of these non-profit
making associations?" which Chafee raised in his :seminal article, The Internal
Affairs of disociation Not For Profit, 43 HAIv. L. REv. 993 (1930).
56 With respect to the issue of state action, see, Pasley, Exclusion and Expulsion From
Non-Profit Organizations-The Civil Rights Aspect, 14 CLBV.-MAR. L. Rav. 203 (1965).
Both Professor Pasley and the court in Paglia assume that strictly private action
cannot be reached by constitutional prohibitions. Recent cases may question this
assumption. See, note 57 infra; See, discussion of Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recre-
ation Ass'n., Inc., infra.
57 THE PUBLIc HEALTH & WELFAPE, 42 USC. §'2000 (1970); In Paglia petitioners did
not raise the issue of 42 U. S. C. A. § 1981 which applies to private action. Boudreaux
v. Baton Rouge Marine Contiacting Co., 437 F. 2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Walaz v.
Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M. D. Ala. 1970).
58 Although the corporation was incorporated prior to the New York legislation the
court held the new law applicable. Paglia v. Staten Island Little League, 66 Misc.2d
626, 322 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
59 See, cases on invalidity of regulation governing expulsion collected in Annot., 20
A. L. R. 2d 344-, 374 (1951).
60 See, Frieden, Judicial Reviewj of Expulsion Actions in Voluntary Associations, 6
WASHEURs L. J. 160 (1966).
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found no evidence of prejudicial, capricious or arbitrary treatment
of the members. The court does not deal in any satisfactory way with
the issue of expulsion of a member for the conduct of another, this
(at least) raises a question of draftsmanship. Should by-laws be so
structured as to make this result possible?
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n. Inc.61 is another in the
voluminous number of cases62 testing the extent to which private
racial discrimination is sanctioned by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
exempting from its operation "a private club or other establishment
not in fact open to the public. '63 In this case the plaintiffs were denied
membership in a neighborhood swimming pool organized as a non-
profit corporation. The court significantly held that the exemption
applied to the civil rights Act of 186664 as well as to that of 1964 and
devoted most of its attention to an examination of whether the "club"
was in fact private on the basis that it was owned, operated and con-
trolled by its members and financed by their payment of substantial
dues for the exclusive use of members and their guests and despite
the fact it was exempt from state income taxation, constructed under
special exceptions to local zoning ordinances and lack of significant
standards other than racial for admission to membership. In so
holding it would appear that the court has departed from the stand-
ards which at least one author predicted would be applied to the ex-
emption, i.e., genuine selectivity, absence of an integral part in the
recreational activity of community and lack of public support.65 All
were lacking ingredients in the ease and the court chose instead the
standard of membership control.6
Questions of standing and ultra vires are recurring in non-profit
corporation cases. New Liberty Medical and Hospital Corporation v.
E. F. Hutton and Co.6 7 involved both. The issue was whether a Missouri
not-for-profit corporation could finance the building of a hospital by
issuing a debenture and then lease it to a public hospital district.68
51 451 F. 2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1971).
62 See, cases cited in Note, The Private Club xemption to the Civil Rights .4ct of 1964:
A Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1112 (1969).
63 THE PUBLic HSEALTH AND WELFARE 42 U. S. C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
64 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981-82.
:5 See, note 62 supra at 1133-1134.
66 In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that racially discriminatory "guest" policies of a membership
club (conceded to be private) did not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment in that state action was not involved. The fact that the lodge
was licensed by the state liquor board did not sufficiently implicate the staff in the
lodge's discriminatory practices. The court did hold, however, that the state liquor
board's requirement that every club licensee adhere to its by-laws involved the statein sanctioning discriminatory practices and that any action by the state to enforce-
such a rule would be enforced.
67 474 S. W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1971) (rn banc).
68 The opposite situation occurred in Murphy v. Erie County, 28 N. Y. 2d 80, 268
N. E. 2d 771 where a county under a state enabling act built a stadium through the
issuance of bonds, and then entered into a 40 year lease and 20 year management
contract with a private corporation for the use of the facility. The court rejected the
taxpayers contention that the agreement was a gift of county property in aid of a
(Continued on next page)
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The court took a mechanistic view that the corporation held a cer-
tificate of incorporation as a non-profit corporation and could only
be challenged as such in a direct proceeding by the state.69
To the claim that it had no power to lease, the court countered
that the state statute expressly permitted what the corporation under-
took to do, specifically authorizing not-for-profit corporations to,
"sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease as lessor, and otherwise dispose
of all or any part of its property and assets.1
70
Standing was the key to the decision in Miller v. Aldenhold"'
although the majority and concurring opinions differ as to rationale.
Students at a private college incorporated as a charitable corporation
brought suit against the trustees of the college for alleged failure in
their duties. The majority of the court held that the relationship
between the students and the college was purely contractual and that
the former had no standing to enforce the duties of the trustees. On
the other hand, the concurring opinion found the students to be ben-
eficiaries of a charitable trust but without standing inasmuch as the
Attorney General had the sole and exclusive power under the local
statutes to represent them.7 2
The relationship between non-profit and similar unincorporated
entities is still not satisfactorily delineated. In Boozer v. United Auto
Workers of America, Local 457,73 the court rejected the arguments of
plantiff that an association might be sued in its name on the grounds
that (1) several state statutes recognize unincorporated associations
as legal entities for purposes of the particular acts; and (2)
"... modern unincorporated associations such as labor unions are,
except for a corporate charter, as a practical matter in no way differ
from modern corporations.... " The court was clearly impressed with
plaintiff's argument and rejected it solely on the basis of stare decisis.
Ultra vires, although nearly completely dead as a business cor-
poration theory, has a continuing vitality in the realm of the non-
profit corporations where purposes are central to the whole concept.
These cases often involve charitable corporations which desire to
(Continued from preceding page)
private undertaking holding that the lease was in furtherance of a public purpose.
According to the court the fact that a private entity might incidentally benefit from it
did not invalidate the transaction, as long as the primary object is to achieve a
public objective. The court distinguished the case from previous cases which had
invalidated similar arrangements on the basis that the prior "deals" involved only
a private benefit.
69 On the question of self-designation as a test of status, see, H. Oleck, sutra note 1,
at 214.
70 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 355.090(6) (1969); H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANI-
ZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS § 40 (2d ed. 1965); 6 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS
§ 2478 (1968).
71 228 Ga. 65, 184 S. E. 2d 172 (1971).
72 This is in conflict with the rule adopted in other jurisdictions that any person having
a sufficient special interest may bring an action to enforce a charitable trust. See,
Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P. 2d
932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244- (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TusTs § 391 (1959);
4 A. ScoTT, TRuSTS § 391 (3d Ed. 1967).
73 279 N. E. 2d 428 (Ill. App. 1972).
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expand their areas of activity or to merge with another organization
with related purposes.
An example is Bertram v. Berger74 where a charitable corporation
having charter purposes; "to provide and operate a churchly home
for the aged -and to engage in other churchly and charity work"
deeded land and gave money to another charitable corporation whose
purpose was "to prQvide and operate as a not-for-profit corporation
of a churchly home for the nursing care of the aged and chronically
ill persons without discrimination on account of race, creed or color."
As a part of the arrangement the donor corporation was to get
first preference in use of the donee's convalescent facilities. Moreover,
the donor had the right to , designate a majority of the members of
the board of the donee. The court held the, gift to be well within the
stated purposes of the donor. corporation especially in the light of
evidence showing the difficulty the donor had in placing residents
who became ill in convalescent homes. The court said:
We have some difficulty in restricting the term "aged" to
those who are physically well and able-bodied and eliminate
from its meaning those who are sick or physically or mentally
incapacitated..... Indeed one of the arguments that the appel-
lants present is that if St. -Paul's wants to provide for a con-
valescence wing to its existing facilities, they may do so and
that is the more appropriate method of accomplishing the
purpose of aid to the .convalescent aged of St. Paul's. It would
therefore seem to be the thrust of the appellants' argument
that care for the convalescent aged is not ultra vires if done by
St. -Paul's itself, but is ultra vires if attempted through a sub-
sidiary corporate entity.76
The problem of whether or not a corporation might amend its
purpose clause to make .intra vires those actions previously ultra vires
was presented in Good Will Home Association v. Erwin.76 A prior de-
cision had held plaintiff's operation of a college preparatory school
was ultra vires.77 The lower court was to approve a plan for the future
operation of the corporation. Following the state procedures for
amendments the corporation's board of directors approved an enlarged
purpose clause, which would cover the ultra vires acts. The Attorney
General took exception to the procedure as not within the spirit or
intent of the Supreme Court's prior decree,' but the court itself dis-
agreed. According to the Supreme Court, while the activity was ultra
vires, the amendment tb permit it..was not The court concluded that
power to amend its charter was well within the lawful authority of
the corporation, and that the earlier decision imposed no limitation
on the authority of .the board of directors to change the purposes.
The Erwin case is les 'significant for its conclusion on the merits
than as a warning to the draftsmen of corporate articles. If there is
74 1 1l1.'App. 3d 743, 274 N. E. 2d'667. (1971).'
Is id. at 746, 274'N. 'E. 2d at 669: ' " ':
76 285 A. 2d 374 (Me. 1971).
77 Goodwill Home Association v. Erwin, 266 A. 2d 218: (Me. 1970).
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a serious desire to limit purposes, care must be taken to limit the
amending power.
. If there is any discernible trend in the types of not-for-profit
corporations which are being organized it is what might be character-
ized as the quasi-public corporation.78 This type of entity is often
organized under local not-for-profit corporation laws to administer
grants of federal moneys for particular programs. The local laws
provide a structure for the operation of the program reducing to a
minimum the effort which must be devoted to organizational appar-
atus. The other side of the coin, however, may be that the local law
may be used by local officials hostile to the project as a means to
obstruct the corporation's activities.79 Williams v. Tri-County Commu-
nity CentersO raises this issue in the context of a removal procedure.
The case concerns a not-for-profit corporation organized under the
Mississippi Code, for the purpose of providing services for the poor.
The corporation had received a federal grant from the Office of
Economic Opportunity to institute a health care delivery program.
The governor of Mississippi then brought an action in quo warranto
on the basis that the corporation was exercising powers ultra vires.
The corporation removed the case to the federal court claiming
removal jurisdiction under a federal statute providing for removal
where the removal petitioner is unable to enforce a right under a law
providing for equal rights or where an official has acted under color
of authority derived from a law providing for equal rights.8 1 The
rights claimed by petitioner were those under civil rights legislation
passed in 1968 providing criminal penalties for whoever by force or
threat of force wilfully interferes with any person in the right to par-
ticipate in and enjoy the benefits of federally financed assistance,82
and rights denied under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and their complementing legislation.
The defendant claimed that the quo warranto proceeding had been
brought for the sole purpose of harrassing the corporation and pre-
venting its operating a health service program for the poor. The
federal district court granted the plaintiffs motion to remand, hold-
ing that defendant was anticipating the action of the state court.
According to the court, § 2 of the statute was applicable only to fed-
eral officers and § I required a showing both that (a) a federal right
existed and (b) the right had been denied or could not be enforced
in state courts. "A corporation has no federal right to be free of a
state quo warranto proceeding." The motivation of the officers in
78 See, Lesher, supjra note 1, 964-73.
79 For a general view of various types of local interference in such activities, see Note,
The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81 YALE L. J. 231
(1971).
80 323 F. Supp. 286 (S. D. Miss. 1971).
81 JUDICIAL CODE Or 1948, 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1970).
82 CIVIL RIGHTs AcT oF 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 245 (1970) ; CVIL RiorS ACT OF 1870, 16
Stat. 144 (1871), 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (1970); CIVIL RIrHTs Acr or 1866, 14 Stat. 27
(1868), 42 U. S. C. § 1982 (1970) ; CIVIL RIG"HTS Acr oF 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1873),
42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1970).
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bringing the action is irrelevant. 83 The court took. a more positive
attitude toward the alleged behavior of state officials with respect
to attempts by the defendant to amend its charter or obtain a new
charter which would expressly provide for the operation of the health
service. The Attorney General had held any action on the applications
in abeyance pending the outcome of the case at bar.
The court indicated that federal injunctive relief might well be
available if either the state court refused relief or the state officials
continued to refuse to act. The court said:
Under state law, and not necessarily because of a federal
right, defendant is entitled to a decision from the respective
officials whose duty it is to act on the proposals without un-
reasonable delay. See § 5310.1, Mississippi Code of 1942. The
court feels that if the state court does not give relief on this
issue, and if the action by state officials is unduly delayed,
or arbitrarily or discriminatorily made, the doors may then
open to federal jurisdiction. And further, if, in the course of
a state trial on the quo warranto proceedings, defendant is
denied equal rights under color of law then the circumstances
may be such as to require federal injunctive relief.8 4
Strongweil Inc. v. Muncin,8 5 also raises the problem of the relation-
ship of state law to the activities of federally funded non-profit cor-
porations. There the defendant in a law suit was represented by
Morrisania Legal Services, also an O.E.O. funded activity. The plain-
tiff asked for an order directing defendant's attorney to withdraw
on the ground that defendant's income was in excess of $10,000, the
standard of indigency set up by the appellate division. Clearly re-
luctant to face the issue head-on the court used local not-for-profit
law to avoid a decision by holding plaintiff had no standing to raise
the question. According to the court, the plaintiff was really raising
the question of whether the representation was ultra vires under the
state not-for-profit corporation laws which restrict the right to raise
the issue to members and creditors.
98 The district court relied on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Greenwood
v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827 (1966) where Justice Stewart stated:
It is not enough to support removal'under § 1443(1) to allege or show,
that the defendant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and cor-
ruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the
charges against the defendant ire false, or that the defendant is unable to
.obtain a fair trial in a particular state court. The motives of the officers
bringing the charges may be corrupt, but that does not show that the state
trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or that in any
other manner the defendant will be 'denied or cannot enforce in the courts'
of the state any right under a federal law providing for equal civil
rights. The civil rights removal statute does not require and does not permit
the judges of the federal" courts to put their brothers of the state judiciary
on trial.
94 323 F. Supp. 286 (S. D. Miss. 1971).
85 67 Misc. 2d 731, 325 N. Y. S. 2d 252 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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Conclusion
The seventies will not erupt into a golden era of non-profit cor-
poration case law no more than did the sixties or fifties. Questions
of charitable immunity and statutory exemption will continue to be
regularly litigated inasmuch as there is a money judgment or money
saving reward for doing so. In the meantime the activities of this
rapidly increasing number of entities go unregulated either from
the public or from internal sources. Non-profit corporation acts pro-
vide only the most formal remedies against abuse (such as quo
warranto) and depend upon enforcement by public officials whose
interest is marginal or non-existent. It is only where a private feud
develops that members will put their cash on the line and take to
the courts for vengeance and vindication. Otherwise they prefer to
pick up their marbles and either go home or join another "club."
Even when interesting points of law do develop (as did in the
Strickland and Howe and S.P.S. Consultants Inc. cases) judges are re-
luctant to be adventuresome. With sparse case law in the field, they
seem reluctant to look to other areas for precedent and keep to what
is safe and well established.
One sign of life, however, is the developing quasi-public corpora-
tion. The activities of such corporations are of sufficient interest
either to the public in general or to groups and business entities which
they oppose or which oppose them that we may expect to see law
develop as a corollary to their proliferation. Otherwise, progress (or
change which is not always the same thing) will come only through
legislation-and then only when a general awareness develops as to
vastness of the resources and activities of such corporations.
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